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RECENT MINNESOTA CASES
Commercial Law-INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR THE LETTER-OF-CREDIT
CUSTOMER-Shaffer v. Brooklyn Park Garden Apartments, - Minn.
__, 250 N.W.2d 172 (1977).
The protections afforded a Minnesota letter-of-credit customer under
article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) were expanded in a
1977 decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court. In Shaffer v. Brooklyn
Park Garden Apartments,' a case of first impression in Minnesota, the
court enjoined the honoring of a letter of credit where the beneficiary of
the letter had committed fraud in presenting the letter for honor to the
issuer.
In Shaffer, First National Bank of Minneapolis (First National) is-
sued two irrevocable letters of credit' to defendant Brooklyn Park Gar-
den Apartments (Brooklyn Park) upon request of the plaintiff custom-
ers, Shaffer and Severson. The letters were to be used as a security
device for two promissory notes, given by the plaintiffs to Brooklyn
1. - Minn. - , 250 N.W.2d 172 (1977).
2. The classic letter of credit is an instrument by which the bank permits a seller of
goods, upon the seller's performance, to draw against an account of the buyer. The letter
is simply a stipulation by the bank, in legal form, that all such bills drawn under the
account will be honored. Another form of letter of credit is the standby letter of credit,
which assures payment to the beneficiary should the customer fail to perform. See Har-
field, The Increasing Domestic Use of the Letter of Credit, 4 U.C.C. L.J. 251, 258 (1972).
Technically, the letters of credit issued by First National were standby letters of credit.
The development of the "standby" letter of credit reflects an extension of the letter of
credit into the field of commercial credit as a financing mechanism. The issuer bank
promises to pay a sum of money upon certification from the beneficiary that the customer
has defaulted on an underlying obligation. The purposes for which a standby letter of
credit is used, therefore, are basically the same as those for which a contract of surety
or guaranty is used. See Jarvis, Standby Letters of Credit-Issuer's Subrogation and
Assignment Rights (pt. 2), 10 U.C.C. L.J. 38, 45 (1977). See generally Katskee, The
Standby Letter Of Credit Debate-The Case for Congressional Resolution, 92 BANIMMG
L.J. 697, 701 (1975). Unlike the duty of a guarantor, however, the issuers of a letter of
credit has no duty to insure the fulfillment of the underlying agreement. See Comment,
Commercial Letters of Credit: Development and Expanded Use in Modem Commercial
Transactions, 4 Cum.-SAm. L. Rav. 134, 142-43 (1973).
A federal court in the 1974 case of Wichita Eagle & Beacon Pub. Co. v. Pacific Nat'l
Bank, 493 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) held that a contract entitled a "letter of
credit" was in fact a guaranty contract because the responsibilities of the issuer included
determining whether the underlying obligations of the parties had been fulfilled. The court
stated: "The instrument involved here strays too far from the basic purpose of letters of
credit, namely, providing a means of assuring payment cheaply by eliminating the need
for the issuer to police the underlying contract." Id. at 1286. Although the instrument was
called a letter of credit, the issuer was required to deal not simply in documents alone
but also in facts relating to the performance of the underlying contract. This invited
protracted and expensive litigation which, according to the court, was "the very evil that
letters of credit are meant to avoid." Id. at 1286-87.
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Park, as a portion of their investment in an apartment project being
developed by Brooklyn Park. Brooklyn Park subsequently pledged the
letters of credit to defendant Wayzata Bank and Trust Company (Way-
zata) as security for a loan to Brooklyn Park. The letters would be
honored by First National only upon certification by Brooklyn Park that
the plaintiffs had defaulted on their obligations under the promissory
notes. The notes were payable by the plaintiffs only upon the happening
of one of two conditions precedent.' Neither of the conditions precedent,
which related to the completion of the apartment complex, ever oc-
curred.' Therefore, the plaintiffs never incurred any liability on the
agreement underlying the letters of credit.
When Brooklyn Park fell into serious financial difficulties, the plain-
tiffs reminded both Brooklyn Park and Wayzata that demand under the
letters would not be proper because of the failure of the promissory notes
to become due and payable. Notwithstanding this written notice, drafts
were drawn along with certifications which fraudulently stated that the
plaintiffs had failed "to meet payment of authorized loans which are
payable."" The drafts were negotiated to Wayzata, who in turn pre-
sented both the drafts and the certifications to First National for pay-
ment. Because the defendants' claim that the plaintiffs had defaulted
on the promissory notes was false, the certifications presented with the
drafts were fraudulent.' The plaintiffs therefore attempted to enjoin
First National from honoring the letters of credit. The district court
denied the request but the injunction was subsequently granted by the
Minnesota Supreme Court. The result reached in Shaffer raises the
question, already considered by a few courts,7 of whether injunctive
relief is an appropriate remedy to be utilized by the courts in letter-of-
3. The promissory notes constituted the final one-fourth capital contribution of the
plaintiffs. The notes were payable only upon the occurrence of either of two events: 90%
occupancy of the apartment complex or the expiration of 12 months following F.H.A.
endorsement of the project. - Minn. at -, 250 N.W.2d at 175.
4. Construction on the project had stopped, a mortgagee was threatening foreclosure,
and foreclosure had begun on $400,000 in mechanics liens. Id.
5. Id. at -, 250 N.W.2d at 176 (emphasis added).
6. Each letter of credit provided that demand for payment could be made by presenting
a draft, a promissory note endorsed to the order of First National, and certification by
Brooklyn Park that funds drawn under the letters were payable because of a default in
the underlying agreement by Shaffer and Severson. Id. at -, 250 N.W.2d at 175. The
certifications made by Brooklyn Park were clearly fraudulent because the conditions to
Shaffer's and Severson's liability on the promissory notes had not been fulfilled. See notes
3-4 supra and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of America v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991,
1000 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (customer might be entitled to a permanent injunction; therefore,
preliminary injunction against honor of the letter of credit granted); Sztejn v. J. Henry
Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (pre-U.C.C. case
involving a letter-of-credit dispute; court held injunctive relief was appropriate where the
documents presented to issuer were fraudulent and where issuer had knowledge of fraud
prior to presentment).
[Vol. 4
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credit controversies.
Generally, a letter of credit is an engagement by a bank or other
financing agency to pay the beneficiary a sum of money upon present-
ment of documents which comply with terms set out on the face of the
letter." The transaction involves three parties: the issuer (a bank or
other financing agency), the customer (the party who requests that the
letter be issued), and the beneficiary (the party to whom the letter
guarantees payment of a specified sum of money subject to conditions
set out in the letter).' The issuer may dishonor the demand if there has
not been strict compliance with the terms of the letter by the benefi-
ciary, but the issuer need not be concerned with the performance of the
underlying agreement by the other two parties. 0
Article 5 of the U.C.C., governing letter-of-credit transactions, was
adopted by the Minnesota Legislature in 1965." As adopted, article 5
constitutes a well-accepted set of rules upon which the business world
and courts rely in order to make use of the letter of credit as a certain,
accepted medium of commercial finance."2 However, the U.C.C. does
8. Examples of the types of documents commonly required include: the commercial
invoice, bills of lading, insurance policies, weighing certificates, certificates of quality or
analysis, and customs and clearance receipts. For example, in the sale of goods the letter
of credit would list the specific items to be sold and the draft demanding payment would
be accompanied by an invoice or a bill of lading covering those specific items. See
Comment, supra note 2, at 143. In Shaffer, the letters of credit required certifications that
the plaintiffs had failed "to meet payment of authorized loans which are payable." -
Minn. at -, 250 N.W.2d at 175.
9. The transaction also involves three separate and distinct contracts. First, there is the
agreement between the customer and the beneficiary which creates the obligation underly-
ing the letter of credit. Secondly, the customer and the issuer have a contract between
themselves whereby a line of credit is established in favor of the beneficiary, with agree-
ment by the customer to pay the issuer for any payments made upon this line of credit.
Finally, the letter of credit itself is a promise by the issuer to pay the beneficiary a sum
of money upon the beneficiary's compliance with specified conditions set out in the letter
of credit. See Justice, Letters of Credit: Expectations & Frustrations (pt. 1), 94 BANKING
L.J. 424, 425 (1977).
10. See MINN. STAT. § 336.5-114(1) (1976), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 695,
§ 2, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 472 (West), which provides:
An issuer must honor a draft or demand for payment which complies with the
terms of the relevant credit regardless of whether the goods or documents con-
form to the underlying contract for sale or other contract between the customer
and the beneficiary. The issuer is not excused from honor bf such a draft or
demand by reason of an additional general term that all documents must be
satisfactory to the issuer, but an issuer may require that specific documents
must be satisfactory to it.
11. See Act of May 26, 1965, ch. 811, 1965 Minn. Laws 1399 (codified at MINN. STAT.
§§ 336.5-101 to -117).
12. One commentator has stated:
The draftsmen of Article 5 set out to codify the legal framework of letters of
credit without attempting so comprehensive a treatment as to hinder the devel-
opment of new practices and uses or to impede the flexibility of the letter of
credit . . . [and] without attempting to codify the practices and mechanical
19781
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not answer all questions which arise out of letter-of-credit transactions."3
Specifically, the question of the appropriateness of granting equitable
relief in letter-of-credit disputes has been left to the courts.'
Historically, courts have been hesitant to apply equitable principles
to letter-of-credit controversies. 5 This reluctance arose out of a desire
for certainty in the marketplace. Today, at least one leading authority
in the field continues to contend that letters of credit should be honored
as long as the documents presented by the beneficiary comply on their
face with the terms of the letter of credit."6 Such a policy, theoretically,
operations followed by banks dealing in letters of credit. The draftsmen appar-
ently felt, and rightly so, that to attempt to include detailed treatment of such
practices would stymie the development of new practices and the further
streamlining of letter-of-credit transactions. The result, produced through many
cycles of drafting, criticism, and redrafting, is a relatively clear, general statu-
tory statement of the nature of letters of credit and of the rights and obligations
of the parties. Article 5 makes no attempt to restrict, redirect, or revolutionize
letter of credit law and practice; rather, the Article organizes and sets out
existing law in a clear and concise manner.
Comment, supra note 2, at 161 (footnote omitted).
13. The existence of unanswered questions in article 5 was quite clearly the intent of
the drafters. In a comment to section 5-101, the drafters stated that the article was limited
in scope and intended by its terms "to set an independent theoretical frame for the further
development of letters of credit." U.C.C. § 5-101, comment. The drafters reiterated their
desire to instill flexibility into the article in later comments. Their fear apparently was
that a statute which attempted to codify all aspects of letter-of-credit law would hamper
the development of the letter as a financing device. Therefore, the product presented to
the states for adoption embodied the underlying theories of letter-of-credit law, leaving
further development of the area to the courts. See id. § 5-102, comment 2.
14. See notes 21-27 infra and accompanying text.
15. Henry Harfield, in discussing the evolution of letter-of-credit law, states the reason-
ing behind this reluctance:
I fear that the sacred cow of equity may trample the tender vines of letter-of-
credit law ...
The basic tenets of letter-of-credit law derive from the necessities of the mar-
ketplace and not from the aspirations of the cloister. Literal compliance with
the terms of a letter of credit lies at the root of the letter-of-credit transaction.
There is no room for "just as good."
In commercial credit cases, the courts have very consistently recognized this
principle, even in those instances in which a court, sitting as a court of equity,
has enjoined the completion of a letter-of-credit transaction.
Harfield, Code, Customs and Conscience In Letter-of-Credit Law, 4 U.C.C. L.J. 7, 11-12
(1971) (footnote omitted).
16. Henry Harfield, who has been a most ardent opponent of the application of equita-
ble principles to letter-of-credit controversies, has stated:
The cases that I see on tomorrow's calendar are those in which the constructive
ingenuity of lawyers and bankers has used the letter-of-credit device to accom-
plish results that previously had to be accomplished by performance bonds, or
repurchase agreements, or in other ways will use the letter-of-credit device to
solve problems that hitherto have not been, but should be, solved. It is in this
class of case, in which the facts are sufficiently different from the facts in the
case that made the law, and in this atmosphere of instant equity, that the courts
[Vol. 4
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would make issuers more willing to issue letters of credit without fear
that liability might arise on their part for honoring the letters 7 and, if
strictly adhered to, would preclude the application of equitable princi-
ples in resolving disputes arising therefrom.
Assuming that a total "hands-off" policy is not adopted, the court,
in fashioning equitable relief, is faced with considerations above and
beyond the particular hardship facing the parties to the litigation. The
letter of credit has become a heavily utilized adjunct to commercial
transactions. 8 Consequently, the court must determine the economic
ramifications of subjecting such transactions to the jurisdiction of the
equity court."9 The decision becomes one which may have a substantial
impact upon commercial policy and upon the use of and reliance upon
the letter of credit as a finance medium. The question becomes one of
balancing the protection of the customer from the beneficiary's fraud
against the potential ramifications upon the usefulness of the letter of
credit as a commercial instrument and credit device.
20
The U.C.C. provides some guidance for the court in its determination
of whether equitable relief is appropriate in letter-of-credit disputes. 2'
Under the U.C.C., a draft presented by a holder in due course or a bona
fide purchaser of a security must be honored by the issuer. 2 However,
in all other cases the issuer, in its discretion, may honor or dishonor a
draft after being notified by the customer of the existence of "fraud,
forgery or other defect not apparent on the face of the document." 2
Notwithstanding notice to the issuer of fraud in the documents, subse-
quent honor of the drafts is not considered wrongful unless the issuer
fails to exercise reasonableness and care in examining the documents
presented.2' Therefore, in order to avoid liability for wrongful dishonor
will find what I fear may be an almost irresistible opportunity to go wrong.
Id. at 14.
17. See U.C.C. § 5-114, comment 2.
18. Letters of credit are used in conjunction with, and in some cases as substitutes for,
construction contracts, the issuance of commercial paper, performance bonds, escrows,
stock transfers, leases of real or personal property, customs entries, and steamship guaran-
ties. No doubt, the letter of credit has many other uses. One author has even asserted that
the charge card is "nothing more than a plastic letter of credit." Harfield, supra note 2,
at 252.
19. See Harfield, supra note 15, at 8-10.
20. See Shaffer v. Brooklyn Park Garden Apts., - Minn -... 250 N.W.2d 172,
180 (1977).
21. See MINN. STAT. § 336.5-114(2) (1976), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 695,
§ 2, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 472 (West) (court may enjoin honor of draft or demand
for payment when fraud, forgery, or other defect not apparent on face of instrument exists
and when issuer is so notified).
22. See MINN. STAT. § 336.5-114(2)(a) (1976), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch.
695, § 2, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 472 (West).
23. See MINN. STAT. § 336.5-114(2)(b) (1976), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch.
695, § 2, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 472 (West).
24. MINN. STAT. § 336.5-109(2) (1976).
19781
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of the credit, the issuer typically honors demands for payment. Under
article 5, the issuer has nothing to gain by accepting the risks involved
in making a factual determination as to any alleged fraud present in the
documents. Consequently, when fraud is present in the documents pre-
sented to the issuer, the customer must look to the courts for relief.
Under the U.C.C., a court of appropriate jurisdiction may enjoin the
issuer from making payment under the letter and therefore the issuer
must dishonor the demand for payment.n Beyond vesting the court with
the power to enjoin payment, however, article 5 offers no suggestion as
to when the exercise of such power would be justified. The obvious
inference is that the drafters intended that the courts make the neces-
sary factual determinations and then afford equitable relief when
"appropriate.""8 Unfortunately, the vagueness of article 5 leaves the
customer, like the plaintiffs in Shaffer, in the precarious position of not
knowing whether protection against the fraudulent activities of the ben-
eficiary will be granted by the court."
In Shaffer, the court found that the district court had abused its
discretion in denying the plaintiffs' request for temporary injunctive
relief as a protection against Brooklyn Park's fraud.2 Because of Brook-
lyn Park's precarious financial position, honor of the letters of credit
would have denied the plaintiffs an adequate remedy at law. Had the
letters been honored, the plaintiffs would have been required, under
their contract with First National, to reimburse First National for the
monies paid to Wayzata under the letters of credit.29 Because the prom-
issory notes had not in fact become due, the plaintiffs then would have
been entitled to recover this amount from Brooklyn Park, who had
falsely certified that the letters were payable.31 However, Brooklyn Park
25. Id. § 336.5-114(2)(b), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 695, § 2, 1978 Minn.
Sess. Law Serv. 472 (West).
26. The apparent intent of the drafters was to codify the common law dealing with the
letter of credit. See Comment, supra note 2, at 161-62; note 13 supra. This left both the
practices of letter-of-credit transactions and the evolution of their legal bases free to
develop in new areas. See Comment, supra note 2, at 161-62. One commentator has thus
been led to predict an increasing use of the courts to resolve disputes arising from the
adaptations of the letter of credit. See Harfield, supra note 15, at 8.
27. Unless the issuer fails to exercise reasonableness and care in examination of the
documents required by U.C.C. § 5-109(2), the customer has no valid claim upon which to
sue the issuer, but is left solely to pursue his rights in the underlying agreement between
the beneficiary and himself. See J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 18-7 (1972).
28. - Minn. at _ 250 N.W.2d at 181-82.
29. See note 9 supra.
30. By presenting the demand documents to First National and executing the certifica-
tions that the conditions of the letters of credit had been satisfied, Brooklyn Park
became subject to the provisions of U.C.C. § 5-111(1). Under that section, the beneficiary
presenting a demand under a letter of credit is held to warrant that the certifications are
true and the letter is in fact payable. This warranty clearly applies to situations where
the issuer may honor or dishonor a demand under section 5-114. The comments to section
5-114 provide:
[Vol. 4
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was essentially judgment-proof and the exercise of an available remedy
at law would have been useless. Furthermore, the trial court's finding
that Wayzata was a holder in due course of the letters of credit was
erroneous because letters of credit are not negotiable instruments. 31 This
finding of error, coupled with the Minnesota Supreme Court's finding
that Wayzata was not a holder in due course of the drafts presented
under the letters, removed an additional obstacle to the granting of the
temporary injunction." Based on these facts, the granting of a tempo-
rary injunction, pending a trial on the merits, was warranted.
By the Shaffer decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court has deter-
mined that the desire to prevent fraud must at times override the eco-
nomic concern for certainty in letter-of-credit law.3 ' Thus, a customer,
in seeking injunctive relief, may prevent the beneficiary of the letter of
credit from securing the guaranteed payment otherwise promised by the
The issuer may, however, refuse honor. In the event of honor, an action by the
customer against the beneficiary will lie by virtue of either the underlying con-
tract or Section 5-111(1) of this Article. In the event of dishonor, if the presenter
is a person who has parted with value, he also may recover against the benefi-
ciary under Section 5-111(1).
Id. § 5-114, comment 2.
31. See, e.g., J. WroTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 18-2, at 608. Therefore, Wayzata
could not become a holder in due course of the letters by accepting them as security for
its loans. __ Minn. at - , 250 N.W.2d at 176-77.
32. Unlike letters of credit, drafts drawn under the letters can be negotiable instru-
ments. The court recognized that Wayzata had become a holder of the drafts upon receiv-
ing them from Brooklyn Park, but held that Wayzata was not a holder in due course. -
Minn. at -, 250 N.W.2d at 177-78. The attorney for the plaintiffs had sent letters to
both Wayzata and Brooklyn Park's general partner, stating the fact that neither of the
conditions precedent had occurred and that, consequently, demand could not be made
under the letters of credit. Id. at -, 250 N.W.2d at 178. Despite this notice, Wayzata
intentionally rewrote Brooklyn Park's notes in order to present them to First National for
payment. Brooklyn Park then drew drafts for the amount payable under the letters of
credit and negotiated the drafts to Wayzata, who, in turn, presented them to First Na-
tional with the required certifications that the plaintiffs had defaulted in the underlying
obligations. Id. at -, 250 N.W.2d at 176. Because of these actions and because of the
notice it had received from the plaintiffs, Wayzata could not claim the status of a holder
in due course. See MINN. STAT. § 336.3-302 (1976) (defining holder in due course of a
negotiable instrument).
33. The court stated:
It seems quite clear that denial of injunctive relief will leave Shaffer and Sever-
son [plaintiffs] with no recourse against Brooklyn Park or Wayzata. Brooklyn
Park, because of admitted financial difficulties, will not be able to compensate
the plaintiffs for the alleged fraudulent certification. Affirmance of the trial
court's conclusion that Wayzata is a holder in due course would serve to estab-
lish Wayzata's good faith and lack of notice, thereby precluding any remedy the
plaintiffs might have for bad faith presentment.
- Minn. at -, 250 N.W.2d at 181.
34. The court pointed out that because the plaintiffs would be required to post a bond
before the injunction would be issued, Wayzata's loss would be nominal if it prevailed in
the subsequent trial on the merits. Id. at -, 250 N.W.2d at 181-82.
19781
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terms of the letter.35 Although availability of injunctive relief raises the
possibility that a given beneficiary may be denied payment unjustifi-
ably,3" this possibility is insignificant because of two factors. First, strin-
gent requirements of proof must be met by the party seeking injunctive
relief before honor of the letter of credit will be enjoined.3 7 Secondly, the
availability of injunctive relief is conditioned on the requirement that
the presenter of the drafts drawn under the letter of credit not be a
holder in due course. It would be rare, therefore, for an innocent third
party to be denied payment under a letter of credit by the use of injunc-
tive relief.
The question remains whether the court will broaden the Shaffer
decision in the future and extend the availability of injunctive relief to
other letter-of-credit disputes. In Shaffer, the injunction was granted
because fraudulent presentment of documents to the issuer occurred
and because the presenter of the documents was not a holder in due
course. Will the Shaffer decision be construed to require that courts
exercise their discretion and grant injunctive relief where the fraud oc-
35. See also text accompanying note 10 supra (in addition, beneficiary will not receive
payment if terms of the letter have not been satisfied).
36. The resulting burden imposed on a beneficiary who is wrongfully denied payment
under a letter of credit is alleviated somewhat by the requirement that the customer post
security before an injunction will be issued by the court. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 65.03. The
court in Shaffer recognized this, stating: "[If injunctive relief is granted and Wayzata
prevails in the subsequent trial, Wayzata's inconvenience and loss will be nominal since
any potential loss of interest is protected by a supersedeas bond." - Minn. at __,
250 N.W.2d at 182. The supersedeas bond is posted upon appeal from a judgment or order
of the district court. See MINN. R. Civ. APP. P. 108 (1978). Had the district court granted
the requested injunctive relief, the beneficiary would have been protected by the security
required under MINN. R. Civ. P. 65.03, whereas the beneficiary is protected by the superse-
deas bond when the injunctive relief is granted by the supreme court upon an appeal.
Compare MINN. R. Civ. P. 65.03 with MINN. R. Civ. APP. P. 108 (1978).
37. Several criteria must be met by the party seeking injunctive relief before an injunc-
tion will issue. The Minnesota court, in the case of Dahlberg Bros. v. Ford Motor Co., 272
Minn. 264, 137 N.W.2d 314 (1965) held the following factors to be relevant in the decision
of the propriety of affording injunctive relief:
(1) The nature and background of the relationship between the parties preex-
isting the dispute giving rise to the request for relief.
(2) The harm to be suffered by the plaintiff if the temporary restraint is
denied as compared to that inflicted on the defendant if the injunction issues
pending trial.
(3) The likelihood that one party or the other will prevail on the merits when
the fact situation is viewed in light of established precedents fixing the limits
of equitable relief.
(4) The aspects of the fact situation, if any, which permit or require considera-
tion of public policy expressed in the statutes, State and Federal.
(5) The administrative burdens involved in judicial supervision and enforce-
ment of the temporary decree.
Id. at 274-75, 137 N.W.2d at 321-22 (footnotes omitted).
38. See MINN. STAT. § 336.5-114(2) (1976), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 695,
§ 2, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 472 (West).
[Vol. 4
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curs in the underlying contract although no fraud is present in the
documents? The court, in dicta, answers no: "It should be noted that
where injunctive relief is sought, the fraud alleged must be in respect
to the documents presented and not as to the underlying transaction.""S
Existing case law dealing with letter-of-credit controversies generally
supports restricting the availability of injunctive relief to those cases
where the fraud is found in the demand documents."0 Injunctive relief
generally is not afforded where the fraud exists in the underlying con-
tract." Furthermore, the article 5 provision concerning honor of the
letter of credit by the issuer supports such a limitation. The issuer is
explicitly prohibited under article 5 from basing its decision to honor or
dishonor a demand made under a letter of credit upon the terms of the
underlying contract.'" The reason for such a restriction is twofold. First,
the issuer should not have to shoulder the undue burden of determining
whether the underlying obligation has in fact been fulfilled.'2 Secondly,
and perhaps more importantly, such a restriction preserves a substan-
tial degree of the certainty of payment that is an inherent and vital
39. - Minn. at -, 250 N.W.2d at 180 (emphasis added).
40. See, e.g., Moss.v. Old Colony Trust Co., 246 Mass. 139, 140 N.E. 803 (1923) (pre-
U.C.C. case; refusal of issuer to make payment under letter of credit justified where seller
failed to comply with material terms of the letter without regard to actual performance
of underlying agreement); Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 31
N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (pre-U.C.C. case; temporary injunction granted where fraud
was alleged in the documents presented to issuer under letter of credit for payment).
41. See Intraworld Indus., Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank, 461 Pa. 343, 364, 336 A.2d 316,
327 (1975) (preliminary injunction denied where documents presented to issuer were in
conformity with letter of credit; issuer had no obligation to ascertain performance of the
underlying agreement); cf. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 419
F. Supp. 734, 736 (D. Minn. 1976) (issuer may not assert illegality of underlying contract
in attempting to deny payment to the beneficiary). But see United Bank Ltd. v. Cam-
bridge Sporting Goods Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 254, 360 N.E.2d 943, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1976)
(grant of injunctive relief by lower court to preclude honor of a letter of credit where fraud
was proved in the underlying transaction not questioned on appeal); NMC Enterprises,
Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1427 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (upon prima facie
showing of intentional fraud in underlying transaction, customer was entitled to tempo-
rary injunctive relief).
42. See MINN. STAT. § 336.5-114(1) (1976), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 695,
§ 2, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 472 (West).
43. The official comments of the drafters are instructive in assessing the issuer's duty
to honor a letter of credit where an innocent third party is involved:
The risk of the original bad-faith action of the beneficiary is thus thrown upon
the customer who selected him rather than upon innocent third parties or the
issuer. So, too, is the risk of fraud in the transaction placed upon the customer.
When, however, no innocent third parties as defined in subsection (a) are
involved the issuer is no longer under a duty to honor; but since these matters
frequently involve situations in which the determination of the fact of the non-
conformance may be difficult or time-consuming, the issuer if he acts in good
faith is given the privilege of honoring the draft as against its customer, that is
to say, with a right of reimbursement against him.
U.C.C. § 5-114, comment 2.
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characteristic of the letter of credit."
The application of equitable principles to letter-of-credit controver-
sies where fraud is involved is a welcome event in Minnesota. Under the
law developed in Shaffer, a holder in due course of drafts drawn under
a letfer of credit will have an absolute right to demand honor of those
drafts. The issuer, furthermore, may honor a draft even after receiving
notice from the customer that there may be fraud, forgery, or other
defects in the documents presented by the beneficiary or an assignee of
the beneficiary as long as the documents appear on their face to be
proper. The burden of determining whether a demand document has
been fraudulently presented falls upon the court rather than the issuer.
Therefore, the issuer faces the possibility of wrongfully honoring a letter
of credit only if it fails to exercise reasonableness and care in examining
the documents presented to it. Finally, a substantial portion of the
desired element of certainty in letter-of-credit transactions is preserved
by restricting the availability of injunctive relief to those situations
where the beneficiary, or an assignee who is not a holder in due course,
has presented fraudulent documents to the issuer in demanding pay-
ment under a letter of credit. Payment under the letter of credit will be
certain unless the beneficiary wrongfully attempts to evade fulfillment
of the conditions of the letter of credit itself. The decision of the Minne-
sota Supreme Court in Shaffer is a reasoned one, which effectively bal-
ances both the interests of the customer and the beneficiary while pro-
tecting the issuer who must honor the letter of credit it issues.
Indian Law-STATE JURISDICTION OVER INDIAN RESERVATIONs-Red Lake
Band of Chippewa Indians v. State, __ Minn. -, 248 N.W.2d 722
(1976).
Indian law in Minnesota is not a relic of the past as it is in some
states.' The tribal groups of Indian people which inhabit Minnesota's
Indian reservations, both as organized bodies and as individual persons,
interact on a daily basis with Minnesota's various governmental bodies
and non-Indian population. In the course of these interactions, disputes
arise which occasionally end in litigation, thus expanding the body of
0
44. See Harfield, supra note 2, at 258-59; Kozolchyk, The Legal Nature of the Irrevoca-
ble Commercial Letter of Credit, 14 AM. J. Comp. L. 395, 421 (1965).
1. As used in the context of this comment, Indian law relates to the interaction between
a state and the Indian peoples within that state. The states of Alabama, Arkansas, Dela-
ware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and
West Virginia no longer have recognized federal or state Indian reservations. See U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FEDERAL AND STATE INDIAN RESERVATIONS AND INDIAN TRUST AREAS
(1974) (listing all existing Indian reservations in the United States).
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